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On August 27, 1963, the Railroad Labor Dispute Arbitration Act' was
signed into law by the President of the United States. This enactment was
preceded by the passage on June 10th of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 2 Thus ;
the 88th Congress during its 1st session contributed two major statutory
additions to the existing body of federal labor law.
RAILROAD ARBITRATION ACT
Faced with the threat of a national rail strike which would affect up to
ninety-four percent of the nation's rail mileage, Congress, in response to a
special message of the President of the United States, 8 enacted the Railroad
Labor Dispute Arbitration Act. 4
This enactment was precipitated by the inability of administrative
and judicial bodies to bring about, through the use of existing federal media-
tion deyices, a settlement of this dispute satisfactory to both parties.
On August 8, 1962, a United States District Court dismissed a suit
brought by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers to enjoin the imple-
mentation of new work rules by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 5 The dis-
missal of this suit was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court° which
held that there was nothing that could be done within the present federal
statutory framework to prevent the implementation of the work rules other
than the President's creation of an emergency board pursuant to Section 10
of the Railway Labor Act? (hereinafter "RLA"). Subsequently the President
named an emergency board which proved successful only in that it produced
a statutory cease-fire during the deliberation of the board (and thirty
days thereafter), for at the end of that period the parties were still holding
fast to their original positions. The history of this dispute, marked by, the
irreconcilable positions of the parties and by the apparent total inability
of the executive and judicial branches to induce them to reach even a minimal
accord, foreshadowed the inevitability of congressional intervention.
The Act, which relies on the specific arbitration procedures of the RLA, 8
provides for binding arbitration of the current work rules dispute° between
1 77 Stat. 129 (1963). The Act will hereinafter be cited as the Railroad Arbitration
Act.
2 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
3 109 Cong. Rec. 12397 (daily ed. July 22, 1963).
4 Supra note 1.
5 See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 310 F.2d 503
(7th Cir. 1962).
6 Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963).
7 44 Stat. 586 (1926), 45 U.S.C. 160 (1958).
8 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. 157 (1958); 44 Stat. 582 (1926), 45 U.S.C. 158
(1958); 44 Stat. 585 (1926), 45 U.S.C. 159 (1958).
9 Briefly, the existing work rules provide that there shall be two men in the cabs
of diesel freight and yard locomotives and that road and yard crews consist of one
conductor and two brakemen. The carriers demand the right to remove all firemen from
locomotives (except passenger locomotives) and to have the exclusive right to determine
the makeup of all crews. The brotherhoods, on the other hand, argue that firemen
are essential for safety purposes and for the relief of engineers and demand a minimum
road and yard crew of one conductor and two brakemen.
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the carriers'° and the railroad brotherhoods." The arbitration board 12
 is
empowered to render within ninety days of enactment (of the Act) a binding
award as to the use of firemen on other than steam power locomotives and
the makeup of road and yard crews." These "primary issues" represent
portions of the carriers' notices of November 2, 1959," and the brother-
hoods' notices of September 7, 1960, 15
 which set forth the areas of dispute
The Act further provides that the parties shall immediately resume
collective bargaining with respect to all "secondary issuesm° set forth in
the notices." However, in contrast to the original Senate joint resolution, 15
the final version of the Act does not compel arbitration of these "secondary
issues" in the event of deadlock in collective bargaining. This alteration of
the joint resolution means that "only those issues upon which the parties
themselves had neared agreement on the need for arbitrationm° will be
referred to the board.2°
Section 1 of the Act forbids any change in rates of pay, rules or working
conditions except by agreement of the parties and prohibits any strikes
or lockouts. 21
 The Act further provides that the arbitration award shall
be filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 22
that such award is to be in effect for not more than two years 23 and that the
Act itself shall expire, except as to the duration of the arbitration award, one
hundred and eighty days after the date of its enactment?"
This is the second time in our nation's history that Congress has acted
to resolve a labor-management controversy and on both occasions the
10 This includes virtually all of the nation's railroads.
11 This includes the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, the Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen,
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the Switcher's Union of North America.
12 The Arbitration Board is made up of two members selected by the railroad
brotherhoods, two members selected by the carriers and three (neutral) members picked
by the other four, with a provision for Presidential selection in the event of delay
or deadlock. Railroad Arbitration Act § 2, 77 Stat. 129 (1963).
18 Railroad Arbitration Act § 3, 77 Stat. 129 (1963).
14 Those portions of the carriers' notices of November 2, 1959, which are to be
submitted to arbitration are entitled, "Use of Firemen (Helpers) on Other Than Steam
Power" and "Consist of Road and Yard Crews." Railroad Arbitration Act § 3, 77 Stat.
129 (1963).
1 G That portion of the brotherhoods' notices of September 7, 1960, which is to
be submitted to arbitration is entitled, "Minimum Safe Crew Consist." Railroad
Arbitration Act § 3, 77 Stat. 129 (1963).
16 The "secondary issues" include the carriers' proposals on interdivisional runs,
combining yard and road crews and manning of self-propelled vehicles. 54 Lab. Rd.
Rep. 2 (Sept. 2, 1963).
17 Railroad Arbitration Act § 6, 77 Stat. 129 (1963).
18 S.J. Res. 102, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b) (1963).
19 S. Rep. No. 459, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1963).
20 Under the Act, the board's award must be handed down within one hundred
and twenty days after enactment, but will not go into effect until sixty days thereafter.
Railroad Arbitration Act § 5, 77 Stat. 129 (1963).
21 Railroad Arbitration Act § 1, 77 Stat. 129 (1963).
22 Railroad Arbitration Act § 4, 77 Stat. 129 (1963).
23 Ibid.
24 Railroad Arbitration Act § 8, 77 Stat. 129 (1963).
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dispute has involved railroads and their employees. The Supreme Court, in
passing on the constitutionality of a 1916 congressional act, which created
an eight hour day for railroad workers who were threatening a nationwide
strike stated:
... there would seem to be no ground for disputing the power .. .
to exert the legislative will for the purpose of settling the dispute
and bind both parties to the duty of acceptance and compliance
to the end that no individual dispute or difference might bring ruin
to the vast interests concerned in the movement of interstate com-
merce . . . 25
Despite the fact that this arbitration proceeding was the subject of a
specific congressional enactment, there remains grave doubts as to its long
range effectiveness as a solution to this railroad labor controversy. The
removal from the original version of the Act of the requirement that any
"secondary issues" be submitted to arbitration upon breakdown in collective
bargaining2 ° could perhaps be a fatal defect in the enactment. This amend-
ment was intended by its sponsors to narrow the element of compulsion to
its smallest possible area. Indeed, it was intended to limit the jurisdiction of
the board to only those areas of the dispute which the parties had tentatively
agreed to arbitrate, and thereby to alter the approach of the legislation from
that of "compulsory" to that of "voluntary" arbitration. 27 Consequently,
there is a real possibility that only those specifically arbitrated matters will
be resolved and that the "secondary issues" will remain unsettled and act
as stop-gaps to any permanent solution of the controversy. It would none-
theless appear that, despite further dispute between the parties as to those
"secondary issues," the very fact of congressional action will serve as a
constant reminder of the necessity of cooperation and reasonableness in all
future collective bargaining negotiations.
Although it would appear that the Act itself is free from any consti-
tutional difficulties in view of the Supreme Court's position towards solutions
to such extraordinary labor controversies, 28 there remains a quite legitimate
fear that Congress has unleashed a precedent which threatens the very
existence of free collective bargaining. 29 These fears have been heightened
by the efforts of certain members of the shipping industry to effect the
enactment of a compulsory arbitration law for the settlement of maritime
disputes. 3°
The hostility with which the principle of compulsory arbitration has
23 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 350 (1917). The Court interpreted 39 Stat. 721
(1916).
28 Supra note 18.
27 54 Lab. Rel. Rep. 40 (Sept. 2, 1963).
28 See the Court's position in Wilson v. New, supra note 25 and also the Court's
position in United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 43 (1959),
in which the Court stated that there exist ". , . certain rights in the public to have
unimpeded for a time production in industries vital to the national health or safety."
29 See remarks of Representative Roybal entitled "Compulsory Arbitration a
Dangerous Precedent" in 109 Cong. Rec. A5721 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1963).
30 N.Y. Times, April 4, 1963, p. 94, col. 1.
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heretofore been met by Congress can be readily gleaned from a comment
by Senator Taft in discussing whether a provision for compulsory arbitration
should be incorporated into the Taft-Hartley Act. He stated: "We do not
feel that we should put into the law, as a part of the collective-bargaining
machinery, an ultimate resort to compulsory arbitration, or to seizure, or to
any other action. We feel that it would interfere with the whole process of
collective bargaining." 3' (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, the only substantial
deviation by Congress from this anti-compulsory arbitration policy has oc-
curred as a result of labor-management disputes in the railroad industry.82
The treatise writers' viewpoint on this subject is vigorously summarized
by Professor Charles Gregory of the University of Virginia, who, by way
of defense of arbitration in general, indicated his distaste for compulsory arbi-
tration by commenting that:
Neither employers nor unions relished a system under which
some outsider would establish the terms and conditions under which
they would have to live with each other. Compulsory arbitration
had an odious connotation, and they preferred, even at the cost of
strikes and lockouts, to bargain these things out between them-
selves . . . . Unless Congress should provide for it—an incon-
ceivable contingency—there can be no compulsion to settle bargain-
ing disputes through arbitration and to abandon recourse to the
strike and the lockout.33
Cognizant of the antagonisms which any compulsory arbitration law
will draw from so many quarters and of its potential as precedent in any
future dispute (as previously noted), Congress modified the original Presi-
dential draft of the Act by excluding the "secondary issues" from the Board's
purview and transferring the arbitration proceeding itself from the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to a temporary board of private individuals.
This latter modification was thought necessary to discourage the establish-
ment of a permanent compulsory arbitration board.34 These two changes in
the original version of the Act will no doubt go a long way towards discour-
aging the use of this particular solution in any future labor controversy.
In the final analysis, however, it appears to be quite clear that the
significance of this statute as precedent in the event of any future labor
31 93 Cong. Rec. 3835-36 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
32 See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Louisville & N.R.R., 373 U.S. 33
(1963) in which the Court affirmed the enjoining of a threatened rail strike involving
a "time lost" dispute by invoking the provisions of Section 153 of the Railway Labor
Act, 44 Stat. 1185, 1189 (1934), which provides a compulsory substitute for self-help
when minor disputes occur in the railroad industry.
38 Gregory, Labor and the Law, 477-78 (2d ed. 1961). This viewpoint is also
held by Frances Kellar, who, while Vice-President of the American Arbitration Assn,
wrote:
[A]rbitration remains the voluntary agreement of . . persons to submit their
differences to judges of their own choice and to bind themselves in advance,
to accept the decision of judges, so chosen, as final and binding. This natural
right of self-regulation is a precious possession of a democratic society . . . .
Kellor, American Arbitration, 4 (1948).
34 Supra note 19.
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dispute, even of a national nature, will be severely restrained by due process
limitations. The Supreme Court's traditional distaste for compulsory arbi-
tration as a solution to labor disputes was succinctly stated by Mr. Chief
Justice Taft in a 1923 decision which declared unconstitutional a state com-
pulsory arbitration statute invoked during a dispute in the meat packing
industry." Speaking for the majority of the Court he stated:
It is not too much to say that the ruling in Wilson v. New"
went to the borderline, although it concerned an interstate common
carrier in the presence of a nationwide emergency and the possi-
bility of great disaster. Certainly there is nothing to justify ex-
tending the drastic regulation sustained in that exceptional case to
the one before us."
EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963
On June 10, 1963, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 38 was signed into law.
This act, which amends the Fair Labor Standards Act" (hereinafter "the
FLSA"), prohibits all employers covered by the FLSA from discriminating
between employees on the basis of sex by paying lower wages to women
employees for work which is equivalent to that carried on by their male
fellow workers.
The underlying purpose of the Act is to insure that "employees doing
equal work should be paid equal wages, regardless of sex." 4° Thus, one more
fair labor standard has been added to the FLSA which previously included
the following requirements: (1) minimum wage,'" (2) compulsory overtime
pay rate for excessive hours of employment (over forty hours per week), 42
(3) elimination of working conditions that adversely affect the health or
endanger the safety of child employees 4 3 A comparison of the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative purpose behind the prior
fair labor standard enactments and the congressional preamble to the present
Act indicates that this Act is in substantial accord with a single congressional
policy running throughout all of these previous enactments. In 1941 the
Court stated with reference to the FLSA that:
Its purpose as we judicially know . . . is to exclude from
interstate commerce goods produced for the commerce and to pre-
vent their production for interstate commerce, under conditions
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standards of living
necessary for health and general well-being . . . 4 4
35 Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
36 Supra note 25.
37 Supra note 35, at 544.
38 Supra note 2.
39 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 201 (1958).
40 H.R. Rep, No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963).
41 FLSA 9 6, 52 Stat. 1062 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 206 (1958).
42 FLSA 9 7, 52 Stat. 1063 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 207 (1958).
43 FLSA 1% 3(L) and 12, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 203(L); 52 Stat. 1067
(1938), 29 U.S.C. 212 (1958).
44 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109, amended, 312 U.S. 657 (1941).
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Four years later in the case of A. II. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 46 the Court
stated that the FLSA was designed to insure that both men and women
receive fair and adequate compensation for their labor. Similarly the 1963
Act's "Declaration of Purpose" states that "The Congress hereby finds that
the existence in industries engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce of wage differentials based on sex depresses wages and
living standards for employees necessary for their health and efficiency."'"
This statement of purpose indicates that the Equal Pay Act of 1963 was
designed to utilize the framework of the FLSA to bring about a rounding
out of a long-standing federal policy in favor of proper working conditions
and adequate remuneration for the laboring classes engaged in interstate
commerce enterprises.
In order to come within the provisions of the Act the female's job must
require "equal skill, effort, and responsibility"" and be performed under
working conditions similar to those under which employees of the opposite
sex are engaged. Exceptions are provided for unequal payment made pur-
suant to seniority or merit systems, piecework and any "differential based
on any other factor other than sex." 48 The Act also includes a specific
prohibition against any attempt by a "labor organization"4° to induce such
discrimination 50
The Act in its final version represents a substantial variation from the
original Presidential draft, the overall effect of which is to substantially
lessen its coverage and influence. Whereas the initially proposed measure
gave the Secretary of Labor broad regulation and rule making authority,"
the final version deletes this power leaving the Secretary with nothing more
than the role of issuing opinions and interpretative bulletins provided by the
FLSA" (this is considered by some, however, to be quite a substantial pre-
rogative)." The most significant alteration of the original bill, however,
was the congressional decision to incorporate the Act into the FLSA, rather
than enact an independent statute." This alteration restricts the Act's cov-
erage to those areas of employment covered by the FLSA and thus excludes
the employees of hotels,'" laundries," and restaurants" where the number
of women employees is substantial. Also excluded are executive and man-
46 324 U.S. 490 (1945).
40 Equal Pay Act § 2(a)(1), 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
47 Equal Pay Act § 3(d)(1), 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
48 Ibid.
48 Equal Pay Act § 3(d)(4), 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
58 Equal Pay Act § 3(d)(2), 77 Stat. 56 (1963). With respect to labor organiza-
tions it is worthy of note that although the Act is to become effective one year after
the date of its enactment there is included a special provision allowing for a grace period
of up to one year for those "employees covered by a . . . collective bargaining
agreement." Equal Pay Act § 4, 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
51 Supra note 40.
52 Supra note 40, at 3.
53 Supra note 40, at 9 (minority view of Representative Martin).
24 Supra note 40, at 2.
55 FLSA § 13(a)(ii), 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(2) (1958).
56 FLSA § 13(a)(3), 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(3) (1958).




agerial employees, 58 upon whom such an enactment would have considerable
effect albeit it would meet with considerable difficulty in application. Ex-
empt also from the Act's coverage are telephone," agricultural," and local
transit workers."
The official reason for the latter amendment was two-fold: to eliminate
the necessity for creating a new bureaucratic structure for enforcement of a
separate statute" and to facilitate compliance by the affected parties by
virtue of industry and labor's knowledge of existing FLSA provisions."
Nonetheless, it would appear that the underlying motivation for such an
amendment was to pacify the more conservative members of Congress who
would object to an enlargement of federal jurisdiction beyond the FLSA
limits."
Legislation of a similar nature has previously been enacted in some
twenty-two states," but has been viewed by the proponents of federal leg-
islation as largely ineffective for various reasons. They point to the fact
that too many of these laws leave out large numbers of workers:" that
there is no thorough enforcement of these statutes," and that fewer than
one-half of the states have enacted such laws."
It seems quite probable, however, that this enactment will have the
ironic effect of working to the disadvantage of the very group which it was
designed to assist." This prognosis was uttered by Congressman Paul Fin-
dley, who, claiming that "the cost of employing women is higher than the
cost of employing men,"" proposed an amendment which failed to receive
congressional approval. This amendment would have allowed an employer
to show facts indicating "ascertainable and specific added costs resulting
58 FLSA § 13(a) (1), 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 213(a) (1) (1958).
59 FLSA 	 11, 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(11) (1958).
69 FLSA § 13(a) (6), 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C, 213(a) (6) (1958).
61 FLSA § 13(a) (9), 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 213(a) (9) (1958).
62 S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
68 Ibid.
64 [T]here will be no change or expansion of present labor standards appli-
cation.
Those employers who are presently subject to the Fair Labor Standards
Act will be the only ones subject to the new provisions on equal pay.
Under past legislation, coverage would have been based on employers in
commerce having 25 or more employees within a single place of employment.
Thus, a large number of employers, who are presently exempt from Fair
Labor Standards Act coverage, would have been brought under such a bill.
109 Cong. Rec. 8413 (daily ed. May 17, 1963) (remarks of Senator McNamara, sponsor
of the Act).
65 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
66 109 Cong. Rec. 8693 (daily ed. May 23, 1963) (remarks of Representative
Sickles).
61 Ibid.
68 109 Cong. Rec, 8415 (daily ed. May 17, 1963) (remarks of Senator Randolph).
69 Wall Street Journal, June 11, 1963, p. 10, col. 1.
19 109 Cong. Rec. 8705 (daily ed. May 23, 1963) (remarks of Representative
Findley).
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from employment of the opposite sex" 71
 and thereby permit him to pay a
justifiably lower wage to his female employees. Because an employer who
utilizes female labor incurs this additional cost, coupled with his inability
to set-off this expense by paying these employees lower wages, will result in
many employers being financially prohibited from hiring, or continuing to
employ women workers. Thus, there looms the distinct possibility that this
well-meaning piece of social legislation, while providing the majority of work-
ing women with long awaited economic equality, will have the ironic effect
of eliminating from the labor market many members of the fair sex.
THOMAS P. KENNEDY
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
California recently enacted two amendments to its Retail Installment
Sales Act' (the Unruh Act) redefining the rights and obligations of a de-
faulting conditional buyer. The amendments concern such buyer's liability
for the expenses of retaking and storage when the seller has repossessed the
goods prior to a resale and the buyer's subsequent liability for any deficiency
remaining on the contract after the resale. These amendments differ
markedly from the common law, the pre-amendment California Retail In-
stallment Sales Act, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, and the Uniform
Commercial Code.
The amendments are part of a growing field of legislation designed to
protect the buyer under an unwise installment or conditional sales contract. 2
As a result of the increased popularity of this type of financing arrangement,
the law in this area is undergoing a period of legislative expansions Under-
lying these developments is the basic policy conflict between the desire to
protect the buyer-consumer to equalize his bargaining position with that of
the seller-lender and the reluctance to stifle business through over-regulation
of conditional sales financing' This note will trace briefly the development
71 109 Cong. Rec. 8705 (daily ed. May 23, 1963).
1 Cal. Civil Code § 1812.2 — 1812.5 (Supp. 1962), as amended by Cal. Laws 1963,
ch. 1952.
2 It is helpful to outline the nature of the conditional sale as a security device
regulating the rights of the parties to the agreement. The conditional buyer buys under a
deferred payment arrangement. If the buyer defaults, the seller has the power to realize
on his security interest in the buyer's obligation to pay. Ownership, title, and the
attendant risks as to the goods are divided between the parties. The chattel mortgage,
on the other hand, is not limited to the sale of goods, but covers any situation in which
money is lent against tangible security. It is essentially a conveyance from a debtor
to his creditor of a security interest in the property subject to the mortgage, which
binds the debtor until he has fully paid his debt. The chattel mortgagee, unlike the
conditional seller, must record to protect his security interest.
3 Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 Corn. L.Q.
38 (1958).
4 These conflicting policy considerations have been discussed by many of the
commentators. See Hogan, supra note 3; Project: Legislative Regulation of Retail
Installment Financing, 7 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 623 (1960); Project: California Chattel
Security and Article 9 of the UCC, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 813 (1961).
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